© 2001 WorldNetDaily.com
TUESDAY
JULY 31
2001

Amid the violence of the Palestinian intifida, the Israeli government has said it will restrain itself. But in reality, it is poised for a major military strike that would seize portions of the territories and destroy the Palestinian leadership. Israel is exhausting its last options before going to war.

In recent weeks, efforts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have resumed. The Bush administration has begun to back the notion of deploying international monitors to the West Bank and Gaza. And Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said last week that he will stick to the U.S.-brokered cease-fire.

But signs indicate Israel has already begun a countdown to a major military intervention in the Palestinian territories. Fourteen Palestinian leaders have been assassinated in the past month; although Israel has not acknowledged responsibility for all of them, it does have a policy of targeted assassinations, and such actions are often the prelude to a conventional military operation. Israeli forces are testing their avenues of ingress into Palestinian-controlled areas and probably gathering tactical intelligence.

The larger diplomatic and political atmosphere indicates the Sharon government is exhausting its last diplomatic options. It has announced the possible call-up of reservists abroad in order to generate international attention. And the Bush administration is scrambling to draw up plans to quickly deploy monitors to head off conflict.

The Israeli government also appears increasingly convinced that it can mount a messy, but ultimately successful, military operation. Arab militaries are weak. Following the assassination campaign, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will likely seal off the territories and surge into so-called Areas A, now held by Palestinian security forces. Subsequent operations would focus on cleaning out leaders and arms caches while securing a foothold in the largest urban areas.

Such an operation would destroy the Oslo accords and in effect, though not officially, redraw the Israeli border eastward.

The balance of forces

In a conflict, Israel would have the military advantage: The IDF enjoys superiority not only in numbers, training and equipment but also would face split Palestinian forces.

The Israeli military has an active duty force of 172,500 soldiers, with another 425,000 in available reserves. The IDF is the best-equipped force in the region, with advanced capabilities in intelligence and combat systems. The force includes 446 combat aircraft, 3,900 main battle tanks, 133 armed helicopters and a well-outfitted navy used to stop infiltration and arms smuggling.

By comparison, the Palestinian Security Services are a limited paramilitary force. Estimated to number between 35,000 and 40,000, the personnel have had little advanced military training. Nevertheless, many are former members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its militant faction, the Palestinian Liberation Army. Notably, their irregular training is perfectly suited for urban war.

The Palestinians would face disadvantages, however. First among these is the split between the regular security forces and the approximately 1,000 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. These forces, already divided by different politics and leadership, are already operating in cells that would tax Israeli sweeps.

The PSS has a limited number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The Palestinians have a total of 400 anti-tank weapons, 50 SA-7 man-portable surface-to-air missiles, 50 light armor vehicles, 60 81mm mortars, 40 ZPU 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, land mines and hand grenades, according to AFI Research.

Israel's economic advantage also gives it military superiority. Israel's annual defense budget was about $7 billion in fiscal year 2000, backed by $3 billion in aid from the United States. In contrast, the Palestinian Authority spent $500 million in 1999 and $300 million in 1998 on security – although these figures do not reflect funds spent on weapons smuggled in.

Military assistance from the United States to the PSS totaled only $100 million last year, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The logic of the conflict

The chief targets of an Israeli operation would be five to six major areas now under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

These areas comprise the so-called Areas A, the main urban Palestinian areas, that Israeli forces have increasingly probed in recent weeks. These include Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron in the West Bank as well as most of the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli government is probably emboldened by the fact that no Arab military is in a position to come to the rescue of the Palestinians. The Egyptian military, the region's largest, has serious problems with readiness, making it difficult for the Egyptian army to even threaten Israel across the Sinai Peninsula. The Syrian military is weak, too.

The IDF would first seek to seal off the territories, blocking refugees and terrorists. Sealing off the Green Line, the legal international border, would consume a significant number of troops backed by limited amounts of armor. Conventional forces would move into the West Bank and Gaza to establish perimeters so special operations forces could sweep for leaders, operatives and weapons caches. Israeli security would have to blunt terrorist attacks.

But such a primarily urban conflict would begin to wield its own logic, threatening to exponentially increase the number of Israeli troops involved. During the first intifada beginning in the late 1980s, the number of Israeli forces deployed in the occupied territories jumped from no more than 20,000 before Dec. 8, 1987, to an estimated 150,000 soldiers by 1990, according to the Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs.

In a new operation, Palestinian Security Services as well as militants would quickly devolve to a cell structure in order to conduct operations without being detected. As was the case in the last uprising from 1987 to 1993, Israel would have a hard time achieving a clear-cut victory. Three million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More recent urban conflicts, such as Russia's battle for Grozny in Chechnya, underscore the fact that tactics and terrain can hamper a modern, well-equipped military. Urban terrain presents a number of dangers; the close proximity of opposing forces results in more brutal, bloodier fighting. Streets channel the movement of both troops and vehicles, leaving advancing forces open to ambush and blunting the advantage of armor. Buildings provide ample opportunities for sniper fire and limit line of sight.

Moreover, the Palestinians have reportedly established arms caches and supply houses throughout Areas A, according to Israeli news reports and think tanks. These warehouses hold ammunition, weapons, food, water and other supplies. To dismantle the Palestinian Authority, Israel would need to destroy these caches. Special operations forces are the likeliest candidates.

But the process would consume valuable time. Each passing day would give the Palestinians opportunities to retrench or escape into neighboring Arab countries. By sustaining a low-level conflict and trapping Israel into occupation, the Palestinians gain an advantage since they can fight only a guerrilla-type war. Israel's aversion to casualties would also weigh heavily on any operation.

Even if Israel achieves the complete destruction of the Palestinian Authority, it would leave these areas lawless. To prevent anarchy, Israel would need to guarantee security, precluding an exit strategy.

Protecting Jewish settlers in the territories would also present a military challenge.

An estimated 200,000 settlers are dispersed throughout the West Bank and Gaza territories today. The Israeli government has long used the advancement of settlements as a line of defense. Though these settlements are well-guarded, Israeli politics require the defense forces to protect settlers. But the wide dispersal of settlements would require help from the IDF. Illustrative of the problem, Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer recently called for dismantling the farthest outlying settlements so as to avoid straining the military, according to Israeli news reports.

Where it ends

The Sharon government has avoided making any direct threats about reoccupying the territories.

But continued Palestinian attacks against Israelis are undercutting the Israeli government. Going to the peace table now, with terrorist attacks underway, would be seen as rewarding terrorism. Sharon has personally warned that he will not continue to tolerate terrorism.

And Sharon's philosophy predisposes him to seek a dramatic solution. When he masterminded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, he sought to break the back of the Palestinian guerrillas there. Sharon has hesitated to send troops into the West Bank and Gaza because he knows the cost Israel paid for the Lebanon campaign.

The Israeli threat is real. The quick deployment of international monitors is likely the only alternative to conflict.