© 2001 WorldNetDaily.com
TUESDAY
MAY 8
2001

Though Israel has long considered the Egyptian armed forces as posing one of the gravest threats to its long-term security, growing evidence suggests the strength and readiness of Egyptian forces have slipped considerably and that Egypt could not mount an effective military campaign against Israel.

That’s the conclusion of STRATFOR, the global intelligence company, in its latest analysis.

A reduced Egyptian threat is likely to fuel Cairo's efforts to help negotiate a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian standoff. At the same time it provides Israel with more room to maneuver as it fights the Palestinian uprising, STRATFOR concludes.

Since the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt, the United States has spent $36 billion subsidizing the Egyptian military. Today, Egypt not only has an impressive arsenal of equipment, but its personnel roster includes 450,000 active and 320,000 reserve forces.

In fact, the Egyptian military, from the outside, appears better prepared to face off against Israel than it was in October 1973, the last time the two waged battle in the Sinai Peninsula.

But despite the acquisition of top-of-the-line fighter aircraft, main battle tanks and a host of other U.S. military technologies, the Egyptian military suffers from significant readiness problems. The shortcomings would prevent Egypt from mounting an effective thrust into the Sinai should Arab-Israeli enmity over the uprising in Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip reach the boiling point, according to both American and Russian intelligence sources.

Moreover, a reduced Egyptian military threat on Israel's western flank could have wide implications for the outcome of ongoing clashes between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, which once again this week included Israeli troops temporarily re-occupying Palestinian-controlled areas -- this time in the West Bank.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who knows better than most Egypt's historical place in Israeli security affairs, will have a freer hand in executing his aggressive security strategy in the territories in the face of an Egyptian military unable to imperil Israeli territory. Egypt's military troubles also will provide Cairo with added incentive to use its remaining military and diplomatic muscle to identify a temporary, if not permanent, settlement to the seven-month Israeli-Palestinian standoff.

According to Russian and American intelligence officials -- including those who have observed recent Egyptian and joint military exercises, such as the biannual "Bright Star" war games conducted by Egypt, the United States and the United Kingdom -- the gap between Egyptian and Israeli combat capabilities remains significant.

These sources reveal, for example, that the combat qualities of Egyptian officers and soldiers are comparatively low. On the other hand, these sources indicate Syrian officers and soldiers -- often considered less trained and ready -- actually pose a more imminent threat to Israel than Egyptian forces.

The major stumbling block for Egypt appears to be its inability to ready and deploy forces quickly enough to successfully pose a threat in the Sinai and southern Israel.

American and Russian sources estimate it would take Egypt five to six months to be fully prepared for war, including mobilizing both human and materiel resources to match the more than 300,000 troops it was able to deploy quickly to western side of the Sinai against a much smaller Israeli force of fewer than 20,000 troops in the run-up to the 1973 October War.

Logistics is especially difficult. Prior to the 1978 peace agreement with Israel, Egypt was dependent almost solely upon Soviet hardware, expertise and military strategy. In the ensuing years, Cairo has been the largest recipient of U.S. conventional military assistance behind Israel; as a result, its approach to warfare has changed dramatically. Moreover, much of the Soviet equipment is in storage, providing further indication that logistics would be more of a burden now than it was in 1973.

More logistically intensive than the Soviet model, American sponsorship would require Egyptian logisticians and engineers to tackle a much larger task in supplying and re-supplying the forces as they prepare for and wage battle.

Egypt's problem is not a lack of equipment but a dearth of capabilities in getting its equipment where it needs to be quickly -- and then supporting it once it is there.

Another key area in which Egypt appears lacking is training. Observers of Egyptian military exercises say Egypt clearly has not trained its forces well enough to prepare for an all-out war.

The mobilization problem has to do with both of these areas. Inadequate training and logistics will slow any deployment. And a quick deployment is the most critical factor if Egypt is to have a chance against the better-trained and better-equipped Israeli forces.

This is a critical point because timing would be a key element in any battle for the Sinai. An attack would depend almost solely upon the element of surprise. Though it ultimately failed in 1973 to defeat the Israel Defense Forces, Egypt was able to inflict heavy losses on Israeli forces in the first few days of the conflict, when it took Israel at least 24 hours to flow in re-enforcements. The second day of the war, Oct. 8, 1973, was arguably the greatest defeat in Israeli military history.

Egypt's struggles are highlighted when considering the location of its four major bases: Cairo, Ismailia, Sinai and Suez. The fact that Egypt cannot mount an attack from its Sinai and Suez bases, both in ideal locations, is telling of how unprepared it has become.

In recent months, Egypt has looked to right some of the imbalance with Israel. It has focused primarily on acquiring additional new and improved weapons from both the United States and Russia.

To check Israel's dominant air force, Egypt is embarked on a $3.2 billion U.S. program to acquire 24 new F-16 fighter jets with advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, although they cannot be mounted on the aircraft in deference to Israel. On the ground, it is co-producing 200 Abrams tanks in Egypt. It is also acquiring new Patriot anti-missile batteries. Cairo is also in the market for U.S.-made rocket systems and submarines, and representatives recently met with Russian defense officials to discuss acquisition of rocket and missile technology from Moscow.

A move by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to get involved militarily in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians always has been highly improbable. There are 1,900 multinational peacekeepers in the Sinai, including 800 Americans, who provide a natural buffer to any military forays into the eastern half of the peninsula. Moreover, such a move would guarantee a negative international reaction, particularly from Egypt's mentor, the United States.

But Egypt's military involvement is much more improbable if Cairo can't mount an effective battle force to achieve the element of surprise that was so critical to its battlefield successes against Israel in 1973. This fact is well-known in Israel.

Evidence that the Egyptian military suffers from major readiness problems that prevent it from posing a major threat to Israel provides the Sharon government with extra slack in achieving its security objectives with regard to the Palestinians. With little prospect for an Egyptian military response -- the linchpin of another Arab-Israeli War -- Tel Aviv can focus its energies in the West Bank and Gaza and in Syria-influenced Lebanon.

Israel also can stonewall international efforts to reach an immediate settlement. Israel has ignored the findings of the Mitchell Commission -- headed by former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and tasked with helping identify a solution to the current standoff -- by saying it will continue to build new settlements on occupied Palestinian land.

For its part, Egypt will step up its efforts, such as an Egyptian-Jordanian proposal for a ceasefire, to bring an end to conflict before it escalates further. Cairo will seek to avoid a war it is not prepared to win.